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#2A - 10/8/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - Case No. U-11238 
STATE OF NEW YORK (OFFICE OF MENTAL 
RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES) 
Respondent. 
ROGER L. SCALES, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, ESQ. (MARIE D. DUKES of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York 
State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) to a decision by 
the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director). The Assistant Director 
dismissed PEF's charge against the State of New York (Office of 
Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities) (State or OMRDD) 
which alleges in relevant part that the State violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it abolished a position at its Monroe Developmental 
Center (Monroe Center) because the incumbent, James Hooper, had 
exercised speech rights protected by the Act. 
Board - U-112 3 8 
-2 
PEF's exceptions are addressed to that part of the Assistant 
Director's decision-^ concerning the participation by Michael 
Raha, Monroe Center's Deputy Director of Developmental Services, 
in the process which lead to the decision to abolish Hooper's 
position. The Assistant Director dismissed PEF's allegation that 
Raha selected Hooper's position for abolition in 1989 because 
Hooper spoke at a labor-management meeting in late 1985 or early 
1986 in opposition to a certain patient treatment program 
championed by Raha. After hearing, the Assistant Director held 
that PEF's allegations of impropriety were not proven, noting, 
incidentally, that the abolition of Hooper's position was 
consistent with the criteria applied to other abolished 
positions. 
PEF alleges in its exceptions that the Assistant Director 
failed to draw the correct conclusions from the facts in the 
record and argues that the record proves that Hooper's position 
was abolished because he spoke in opposition to Raha's patient 
treatment program. 
The State urges us to affirm the Assistant Director's 
decision. 
PEF's exceptions allege no mistake of material fact in the 
Assistant Director's decision. Rather, PEF contests the 
Assistant Director's interpretations of the facts and it urges us 
^/pEF did not file exceptions to the Assistant Director's 
dismissal of allegations that OMRDD's approval of Monroe Center's 
decision to abolish Hooper's position was due to remarks made by 
Hooper which were critical of OMRDD. 
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to adopt inferences of impropriety rejected by the Assistant 
Director under the same facts as were presented to him. Having 
reviewed the record, we affirm the Assistant Director's decision. 
Monroe Center was required by OMRDD to abolish several 
positions. Raha recommended four positions within middle to 
senior management for abolition, including Hooper's, under 
instructions that the positions should be targeted based upon an 
assessment of need and the incumbents' involvement with direct 
client services. The Director of Monroe Center approved the 
abolitions as unanimously recommended by the six members of his 
cabinet which included Raha, and, as the Assistant Director 
noted, there is no claim or showing by PEF that any of those 
individuals, other than Raha, held any animus towards Hooper or 
that the recommendations deviated from the targeting 
instructions. 
Against this background, we are unable to conclude that 
Hooper's having spoken in opposition to a patient treatment 
program favored by Raha years before the abolition in issue was 
even a factor in Raha's recommendation to abolish Hooper's 
position despite Raha's anger about the denigration of the 
treatment program and his acknowledged inability to interact well 
with people, including union representatives. Nothing contained 
in the record establishes or suggests that Raha's dealings with 
PEF representatives differ from his dealings with others. 
Neither the necessary improper motivation nor the necessary 
causation between Hooper's statements and the abolition of his 
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position is established by the facts offered by PEF that Hooper's 
comment was protected, that his on-the-job relationship with Raha 
was almost exclusively through his PEF office, that not everyone 
agreed with Raha's recommendation regarding Hooper, that Hooper 
continues to do similar work at Monroe Center^/, or that others 
in middle or upper management positions did not have their jobs 
abolished. 
PEF argues, however, that the abolition necessarily violated 
the Act because Hooper's statement was protected and Raha did not 
know whether Hooper was expressing his personal views about the 
treatment program or only PEF's. This argument necessarily 
assumes that Raha recommended Hooper's position for abolition 
because of the comments he made at the labor-management meeting 
and we have already decided that the record does not support this 
conclusion. However, even on the stated assumption, PEF's 
argument does not have merit. 
Although Hooper is protected in his articulated opposition 
to the program, if commitment to the treatment program was a 
reasonable and necessary part of Hooper's job, as seen by Raha, 
then, for purposes of the Act, Raha could base his job 
recommendation on Hooper's opposition to the program. That Raha 
^Monroe Center's Director instructed staff that efforts 
were to be made to "find something" for anyone who wanted to stay 
at Monroe Center. On abolition of his former position, Hooper 
was appointed to a newly created position at Monroe Center which, 
although lower paid, involved essentially the same duties as his 
former position. Hooper chose to stay at Monroe Center for 
personal reasons rather than exercise his bumping rights to an 
equivalent position in a different facility. 
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learned of Hooper's feelings about the treatment program from 
comments made in Hooper's capacity as a PEF officer is 
immaterial. The Act protects the statement and the speaker for 
making the statement, but it does not, as the Assistant Director 
observed, necessarily and always insulate the speaker against all 
on-the-job consequences of the statement.-3/ 
As to the second aspect of PEF's argument, even assuming 
that Raha's recommendation was premised upon a mistaken under-
standing of Hooper's disagreement with the behavior modification 
program, that would not make the recommendation a violation of 
the Act because the recommendation in that event would not have 
been made because of any exercise of protected right. Rather, 
Hooper's position then would have been recommended for abolition 
because of Raha's belief, however incorrect, that Hooper would 
not or could not perform all of the duties Raha believed should 
be required of the incumbent of that position.-^/ A mistake may 
be relevant in the context of the parties' grievance procedure or 
for other internal or external sources of review, but not for 
purposes of PEF's interference and discrimination allegations. 
•2/see Brunswick Cent. School Dist. , 19 PERB f3063, at 3126 
n. 3 (1986). 
^•/see City of Rochesterf 19 PERB f3081 (1986) , in which we 
held that an employee does not have an entitlement to a job if 
the employee's exercise of a protected right interferes with the 
performance of all of the required job duties. 
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Our decision in State of New York (SUNY) , ^ is not, as PEF 
argues, to the contrary. In that case, we concluded that the 
employer, however unintentionally, had punished an employee for 
having filed a grievance, a protected activity. In that case, 
therefore, there was retaliation for the exercise of a protected 
right. Here, in contrast, we cannot find that Hooper's position 
was abolished because he spoke at the labor-management meeting. 
An abolition premised upon a perceived, but perhaps mistaken, 
negative attitude by Hooper about duties associated with his 
position, which was revealed by the statements he made, does not 
violate the Act. 
For the reasons set forth above and those in the Assistant 
Director's decision, we deny PEF's exceptions and affirm the 
Assistant Director's decision. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 8, 1991 
Albany, New York 
>ayUine K i n s e l l a , Ct Patfline i n s e l l a , Chai rperson 
t e r L. E i s enbe rg , Member 
Schmertz, Memcery 
•^/l2 PERB fl3009 (1979) . 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
LOCAL 200B, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- -and - Case No. U-11689 
WEST GENESEE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
LAWRENCE E. DALE, for Charging Party 
GARRY A. LUKE, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Service 
Employees International Union, Local 20OB, AFL-CIO (SEIU) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ dismissed 
SEIU's charge against the West Genesee Central School District 
(District) which alleges that the District violated §209-a.l(a), 
(c) and (d) of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it retaliated against five employees because they exercised 
statutorily protected rights and when it unilaterally changed 
certain established working conditions of unit employees. 
The ALJ dismissed the subsection (a) and (c) allegations on 
findings that the District did not interfere with or discriminate 
against any employees because of any exercise by them of 
protected rights. He dismissed the unilateral change 
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allegations, to the extent he found them within our jurisdiction, 
on a finding that the District had the contractual right to make 
the changes under a broad management rights clause. 
SEIU's exceptions allege that the ALT made several 
procedural and substantive errors during the hearing and in his 
decision. It is unnecessary to specify each of these exceptions 
because the first of them concerning the ALT's ruling on the 
competency of a witness necessitates that we remand the case to 
the ALJ. 
Lawrence Dale, who is not an attorney, presented SEIU's case 
during the hearings on the charge. Before the close of SEIU's 
direct case, Dale sought to be a witness on behalf of SEIU. The 
ALJ refused Dale permission to testify, either in the narrative 
or pursuant to questioning by others, ruling that Dale was 
disqualified because he had served as the prosecutor of the 
charge on behalf of SEIU. 
We have no rule or practice which disqualifies a person from 
being a witness for a party in an administrative proceeding 
because that person has served as the representative for that 
party in that case. Even the attorneys' Code of Professional 
Responsibility is not absolute in its advocate-witness 
restrictions.^/ As Dale may have offered material and relevant 
evidence, and as such evidence may have influenced the 
disposition of the charge in some respect, it is necessary that 
i/see DR 5-101 & 5-102 in N.Y. Jud. Law (McKinney Supp. 1991 
Appendix). 
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the case be remanded to the ALJ for the limited purpose of 
permitting Dale an opportunity to testify,, with such subsequent 
decision by the ALJ as is then appropriate. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the case be, and it hereby is, 
remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings in accordance with 
the terms of this decision. 
DATED: October 8, 1991 
Albany, New York 
n^\^ 7-v£nWl 
Pau l ine K i n s e i l a , Chai rperson 
Wal ter E i senberg , Member ~T 
E r i c S-chmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEWARK VALLEY CARDINAL BUS DRIVERS, 
NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO, LOCAL 4360, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d — -.- Case-No. U--11-5-1-9 
NEWARK VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JOHN M. CALLAHAN, for Charging Party 
HOGAN AND SARSYNSKI (JOHN B. HOGAN of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Newark 
Valley Central School District (District) to a decision by an 
_ _ T / 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). in relevant part,^ the ALJ 
held that the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally banned 
smoking at all times in its school buses. The ALJ held that the 
smoking ban was neither authorized nor required by either state 
statutes or by the decision of the Appellate Division, Fourth 
Department in Rush-Henrietta Central School District v. Newman 
(Rush-Henrietta) .-2/ 
•^/The ALJ also held that the District improperly restricted 
smoking privileges in the bus drivers' lounge and refused to 
negotiate its smoking policy pursuant to demand. No exceptions 
have been taken to these determinations. 
^/l51 A.D.2d 1001, 22 PERB 57016 (4th Dep't 1989), leave to 
appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 704, 23 PERB f7006 (1990). 
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The District argues in its exceptions that a reversal of the 
ALJ's decision is required by Education Law §3 624 as implemented 
by the Commissioner of Education's (Commissioner) regulation,-3-/ 
by Public Health Law §1399-r(3), by Rush-Henrietta, and by the 
District's inherent right to protect students from the dangers of 
passive smoke. The Newark Valley Cardinal Bus Drivers, 
NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO, Local 4360 (Local) argues that the ALJ's 
decision is correct and should be affirmed. 
We consider first the state statutes and administrative 
regulation relied upon by the District. 
Education Law §3624 and the Commissioner's implementing 
regulation both cover bus drivers during the operation of school 
buses while the buses are "actually being used for the transport 
of pupils". Neither of these provisions prohibits smoking by 
anyone when the bus is not transporting students and, therefore, 
neither authorizes nor requires the District's ban on smoking at 
all times. 
Public Health Law §1399-r(3) is part of the State's Clean 
Indoor Air Act (Clean Air Act). That section of the Clean Air 
Act simply provides that smoking may not be permitted where it is 
prohibited by law or rule. Section 1399-r(3) cannot authorize or 
require the District's total ban on smoking in its buses because 
neither law nor regulation prohibits smoking in buses by all 
persons at all times under all circumstances. 
^8 NYCRR 156.3(g)(5). 
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We consider the existing state statutes and regulations 
which prohibit or restrict smoking in a number of different 
circumstances to reflect the entirety of the State * s current 
public policy regarding the health risks associated with passive 
smoke. The District's contention that there nonetheless exists 
in this case an inherent, residual core of policy or right which 
permits it to avoid a bargaining duty if it acts in the name of 
the students1 health and safety must be rejected.-^ Moreover, 
there are no facts in the stipulated record which would support a 
conclusion that smoking in a bus necessarily presents a health 
hazard when there are no passengers in the bus. 
Turning to the Appellate Division Fourth Department's 
decision in Rush-Henrietta, we agree with the ALJ's rationale 
which distinguishes that case and finds it inapplicable. We do 
not believe that the Court intended to hold that a limited 
administrative regulation preempts all negotiations otherwise 
required by state statute about smoking in circumstances not 
covered at all by the regulation. The history of Rush-Henrietta 
as described by the ALJ and the case cited by the Court do not 
support such an interpretation of the Court's decision. 
If Rush-Henrietta is read to embody, under either Education 
Law §3624 or the Commissioner's regulation, a general and total 
preemption of all bargaining related to smoking in school buses, 
we must respectfully decline to follow that decision. As 
•^See Board of Education of the City School Dist. of the 
City of New York v. PERB, 75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB 57012 (1990). 
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explained by the ALJ, PERB is an administrative agency with 
state-wide jurisdiction charged with the development and 
implementation of a state-wide labor policy. By necessity and 
reason, we can be bound on issues involving the application or 
interpretation of the Act only by decisions of the New York Court 
of Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States should that 
Court ever be presented with a question involving the 
Act.-5-/ Although the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal 
from the Appellate Division, Fourth Department's decision in 
Rush-Henrietta, that denial does not have the effect, as the 
District argues, of making the Appellate Division's decision the 
Court of Appeals' decision. The denial of a motion for leave to 
appeal is not an affirmance of the decision below and it has no 
precedential value.^J 
Lastly, we agree, for the reasons stated by the ALJ, that 
Rush-Henrietta is not properly afforded stare decisis effect. 
For the reasons set forth above, and those in the ALJ's 
decision, we deny the District's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
decision and order. 
•^/Decisions of lower courts can be instructive, but we 
cannot be bound by the decisions of those courts without 
sacrificing the uniformity which is essential to the 
administration of the Act on a state-wide basis. 
•^/Brownstone Publishers, Inc. v. New York City Dep't of 
Finance, 75 N.Y.2d 791 (1990). 
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THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the District: 
1. Rescind its policy, approved February 12, 1990, and 
effective March 1, 1990, insofar as said policy 
prohibits smoking in buses which are not in operation 
transporting students and which either contain no more 
than one nonstudent occupant or contain two or more 
nonstudent occupants, all of whom consent to smoking 
therein. 
2. Negotiate with the Local pursuant to the Local»s demand 
on the issue of smoking in buses which are not in 
operation transporting students and which either 
contain no more than one nonstudent occupant or contain 
two or more nonstudent occupants, all of whom consent 
to smoking therein. 
3. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to employees in the Local's unit. 
DATED: October 8, 1991 
Albany, New York 
/ky4^/f ,<Urv 
Pauline Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walters Eisenberg, Membe:qf 
<£z^ 
Eric J./^Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to affactuate the policies ot the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 t h e e m p l o y e e s o f t h e Newark Valley Central School 
District in the unit represented by the Newark Valley Cardinal 
Bus Drivers, NYSUT/AFT/AFL-Cio, Local 4360, that the District: 
1. will rescind its policy, approved February 12, 
1990, and effective March 1, 1990, insofar as 
said policy prohibits smoking in buses which are 
not in operation transporting students and which 
either contain no more than one nonstudent 
occupant or contain two or more nonstudent 
occupants, all of whom consent to smoking 
therein; and 
2. will negotiate with." the Local pursuant to the 
Local's demand on the issue of smoking in buses 
which are not in operation transporting students 
and which either contain no more than one 
nonstudent occupant or contain two or more 
nonstudent occupants, all o f whom consent to 
smoking therein. 
NEWARK .VALLEY. .CENTRAL- SCHOOL -DISTRICT-
Dated. By. (Raprwantativt) (Tltto) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, COLUMBIA 
COUNTY LOCAL 811, HUDSON CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-11809 
-and-
HUDSON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (WILLIAM A. HERBERT of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
ANDERSON, BANKS, CURRAN & DONOGHUE (ROCHELLE J. 
AUSLANDER of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Hudson City School District (District) excepts to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director). The Director held that the District 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it transferred work exclusive to the aides' unit 
represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Columbia County Local 811, Hudson 
City School District Unit (CSEA) to personnel in the clerical 
unit, which is also represented by CSEA. 
The work in issue is the record-keeping associated with the 
taking of attendance at the middle school. Although both aides 
and clericals have done attendance work in certain of the 
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District's schools, the Director found that there was a 
discernible boundary^/ for the attendance work at the middle 
school and that the aides had exclusivity over that work at that 
school. 
The District alleges in its exceptions that the charge 
should have been deferred to the parties * contractual grievance 
procedure and that the Director erred when he found that there 
was a discernible boundary to the attendance work at the middle 
school. 
CSEA argues in response that the Director's decision was 
correct in all respects and should be affirmed in its entirety. 
The District's procedural exception is dismissed. Deferral 
to the parties' grievance procedure is not appropriate because 
the transfer of unit work was not grievable. There is no 
contractual provision even arguably covering the subject matter 
of this charge.2/ 
On the merits, we affirm the Director's decision. As the 
concepts of unit work, exclusivity and discernible boundaries so 
often identified in our transfer-of-work cases are necessarily 
i/see generally Town of West Seneca, 19 PERB [^3028 (1986) , 
where we first recognized the concept of a discernible boundary 
to the definition of unit work. 
•^The parties' grievance procedure does not end in binding 
arbitration but with a final and binding decision by a review 
panel consisting of unit employees, members of the District's 
board of education, citizens, an administrator and a nonvoting 
chair. Our disposition of the deferral question makes it 
unnecessary for us to decide whether this step in the parties' 
grievance procedure would satisfy our deferral criteria. 
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fact-specific, any analogy to precedent will rarely, if ever, be 
perfect. We believe, however, that our decision in City of 
Rochester-3-^ is closely analogous to this case. In City of 
Rochester, we held that a police officers' unit had established 
and maintained exclusivity over traffic control at a particular 
construction site after 13 months although nonunit personnel 
regularly performed that function at other job sites. City of 
Rochester necessarily endorses the very proposition the District 
now asks us to reject: that job location can form a discernible 
boundary to unit work within which a union may maintain its 
exclusivity even if there is no exclusivity over the job function 
beyond that boundary. 
The factors relied upon by the Director in his decision, 
including the length of time the aides have done the attendance 
work at the middle school, the District•s own posting and hiring 
practices, and the functional and physical separation of the 
aides' and the clericals' work, are at least as compelling as 
those which led us in City of Rochester to conclude that the 
unilateral transfer of work was improper. 
We have reviewed each of the other cases cited by the 
District in support of its exceptions and find none to be 
inconsistent with the result we reach here. Otselic Valley 
Central School District,^/ for example, which the District 
^ 2 1 PERB H3040 (1988), conf'd, 155 A.D.2d 1003, 
22 PERB 57035 (4th Dep't 1989). 
^/l9 PERB 5[3065 (1986) . 
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recites at some length, is inapposite. We there concluded that 
reading to elementary students was not exclusive to the teachers' 
unit. There were, however, no circumstances or arguments 
presented in that case which favored the recognition of any 
discernible boundary as there are in this case. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny the District's 
exceptions and affirm the Director's decision. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the District: 
1. Immediately discontinue assigning attendance 
functions at the middle school to persons not 
within CSEA's aides' unit and forthwith 
restore this attendance work to the aides' 
unit. 
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all 
locations ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to employees in the aides unit. 
DATED: October 8, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the employees of the Hudson City School District in the 
Aides Unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Columbia County Local 811, 
Hudson City School District Unit, that the District 
Will immediately discontinue assigning attendance 
functions at the middle school to persons not 
within CSEA's-aides' unit and forthwith restore this 
attendance work to the aides' unit. 
Hudson City School.District 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CARL E. CARTER, 
Charging Party, 
- and - Case No. U-12001 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, 
COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, 
AFL-CIO, LOCAL 650, 
Respondent, 
- and -
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Employer. 
CARL E. CARTER, pro se 
SARGENT, REPKA & PINO (ROBERT HEFTKA and KEVIN 
STOCKER of counsel), for Respondent 
SAMUEL F. HOUSTON, CORPORATION COUNSEL (DAVID F. MIX 
of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions by Carl E. Carter to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT). The ALJ dismissed 
Carter's charge which alleges that the American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 650 
(AFSCME) breached its duty of fair representation in violation of 
§209-a.2 (c)J=/ of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it refused to process a grievance on his behalf. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge on a finding that AFSCME was 
relieved of its promise to Carter to file a grievance for him 
-^Section 209-a.2(c), added in 1990, simply codifies the 
union's duty of fair representation as developed through case 
law. 
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once it learned that he had resigned from his provisional 
appointment with the City of Buffalo rather than be fired. 
Carter's exceptions address the ALJ's decision only in part. 
Many of his exceptions are directed to allegations that his 
former employer had discriminated against him and had coerced his 
resignation, and to an alleged "concerted effort" among several 
administrative agencies to deny him his constitutional and 
statutory rights. These allegations are either not within our 
jurisdiction to review or were not in issue under the charge 
before the ALJ. To this extent, therefore, Carter's exceptions 
are dismissed without any findings regarding the merits of those 
allegations. 
Insofar as the exceptions do relate to the alleged breach of 
representational duty by AFSCME, we affirm the ALJ's decision to 
dismiss the charge. 
A union does not have, as Carter suggests, an absolute duty 
to prosecute any and every complaint by a unit employee 
regardless of circumstance solely because the employee pays dues 
or fees to the union. A union violates its duty of fair 
representation under the Act only if its conduct is arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith.^J There is nothing in the 
record, even when read most favorably to Carter, which would 
support a conclusion that AFSCME*s conduct violated its duty 
under this standard. There is no evidence of disparate treatment 
in AFSCME's interpretation and application of the relevant 
^/civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. PERB, 132 A.D.2d 
430, 20 PERB 1[7024 (3d Dep't 1987) , aff'd on different grounds, 
73 N.Y.2d 796, 21 PERB 57017 (1988). 
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provisions of the contract. Moreover, its initial willingness to 
file a grievance under a layoff clause on behalf of a provisional 
employee who had been terminated reflects an aggressive 
interpretation of the contract most favorable to Carter's 
interests. Its decision not to pursue that grievance once Carter 
resigned his employment constituted a reasonable exercise of 
discretion. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied 
and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 8, 1991 
Albany, New York 
li f- .f^ttf 
Pauline Kinsella, Chairperson 
l4iAfcz~¥~ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
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This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the 
Communications Workers of America/Graduate Student Employees 
Union, AFL-CIO (CWA/GSEU) and United University Professions (UUP) 
to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director). The Director dismissed CWA/GSEU*s 
petition, which seeks to represent a separate negotiating unit 
Board - C-2894 -2 
consisting of all graduate students of the State University of 
the State of New York (State or University) who hold State-funded 
positions as either graduate assistants (GAs) or teaching 
assistants (TAs), on a finding that the GAs and TAs are not 
covered public employees within the meaning of §201.7(a) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act or Taylor Law). That 
section of the Act defines a public employee as "any person 
holding a position by appointment or employment in the service of 
a public employer. . . . " 
The Director's decision describes in detail the nature of 
the University's assistantship program and the GAs' and TAs' work 
under that program and his findings of fact are not disputed in 
any material respect. We adopt the Director's findings of fact 
and but briefly summarize a few of the basic findings for 
purposes of our discussion. 
There is a significant variation in the assistantship 
program across the academic disciplines at each campus because 
the GA and TA program is largely decentralized. Certain 
generalizations can, however, be made. The University awards 
assistantships to about 15% of its approximately 27,000 graduate 
students based primarily upon established and potential academic 
merit. GAs and TAs are given a stipend of varying amounts and a 
full or partial tuition waiver in exchange for a service 
requirement limited to a maximum of twenty hours of work for the 
University per week on average. TAs normally assist faculty with 
teaching or research activities. Experienced TAs may have full 
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responsibility for a course and grading. GAs may teach, but 
normally they are responsible for nonteaching duties in support 
of a course or a faculty member's research. GAs and TAs 
generally must be full-time students in good standing. The 
assistantships are awarded annually with a limit on renewal 
ranging, with limited exceptions, for two years for masters 
candidates and four years for candidates for doctoral degrees. 
An assistantship is not a degree requirement and no academic 
credit is granted for an assistantship itself. Although by 
University policy the GAs' and TAs1 work is to be academically 
relevant and supervised, the record shows that the GAs1 and TAs1 
work is often unsupervised and that there is a difference of 
opinion between the GAs and TAs and the University's 
administration regarding the relevance to their graduate studies 
of much of the work which is in fact assigned to a GA or TA. 
Against this background, the Director read our decision in 
State of New York (Department of Correctional Services)-^ 
(Correctional Services) to have established a balancing test to 
determine the applicability of the Act to employees such as the 
GAs and TAs. According to the Director, our decision in 
Correctional Services necessitates a dismissal of any 
representation petition if the employment relationship derives 
from and is secondary or subordinate to some other noncovered 
•3=/6 PERB fl3033 (1973), conf'd sub nom. Prisoners' Labor 
Union v. Helsbv, 44 A.D.2d 707, 7 PERB 57006 (2d Dep't 1974), 
amended, 7 PERB 57010 (2d Dep't 1974), motion for leave to appeal 
denied, 35 N.Y.2d 641 (1974). 
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status. In this case, notwithstanding his finding that the GAs 
and TAs are employees as the term is generally defined, the 
Director concluded that the GAs * and TAs' employment relationship 
is not covered because it derives from and is secondary to their 
status as full-time students of the University. 
We note briefly at the outset of our discussion our 
agreement with many aspects of the Director's decision. We agree 
that the GAs' and TAs' dual status as University students and 
employees does not necessarily negate the existence of covered 
employment. The relationships embraced in the dual status of 
student/employee are not mutually exclusive.-2-/ Student status, 
which is necessary to obtain and continue employment under an 
assistantship, is not fundamentally different from other 
prerequisites for hiring and continuation of employment such as, 
for example, residency and licensure requirements. Similarly, 
the benefits derived by the GAs and TAs from their assistantships 
are no more dispositive of the issue before us than the 
advantages secured by other employees from their employment, 
whether those be overall job knowledge, career development or 
enhanced promotional opportunity. 
The Director also properly disregarded as immaterial to the 
instant employment relationship the parties* differing 
characterizations of the assistantship relationships, any 
examination of the GAs' or TAs' motivation for accepting the 
^See, e.g., Long Island College Hospital, 33 N.Y. SLRB 161 
(1970). 
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assistantships, and any analysis of whether and the extent to 
which the assistantships are related to the GAs' and TAs• 
curricular or career goals. The subjective factors which are 
necessarily involved in the analysis of these issues do not yield 
anything of value to the resolution of the representation 
questions in this case. Finally, the Director correctly eschewed 
reliance upon precedents from other jurisdictions or other 
agencies because those determinations often rest upon specific 
statutory language, involve policies unique to a particular 
statutory scheme and/or otherwise reflect a simple yet 
fundamental difference of opinion as to whether students are 
properly regarded as public employees.-3-/ 
Having noted the several areas of agreement with the 
Director's decision, we turn to his interpretation of 
Correctional Services. 
In Correctional Services, an organization representing 
inmates at a correctional facility operated by the State sought 
the right to bargain collectively on behalf of the inmates in 
relation to the work they performed for minimal compensation 
within the facility. We held in that case that prison labor does 
•^Compare Leland Stanford Junior Univ. 87 LRRM 1519 (1974); 
St. Clare's Hospital. 95 LRRM 1180 (1977); Board of Trustees. 
University of Massachusetts, Case No. SCR-2096 (April 25, 1979); 
Ass'n of Graduate Student Employees, Case No. SF-CE-179-H 
(April 26,1989) (student employees excluded) with United Faculty 
of Florida v. Board of Regents. 417 So.2d 1055, modified. 423 
So.2d 429 (1982), aff'd. 443 So.2d 982 (1983); Regents of the 
University of Michigan. Case No. C76K-370 (Nov. 4, 1981); and 
University of Oregon Graduate Teaching Fellows Fed'r, Case No. C-
207-75 (1977) (student employees covered). 
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not constitute employment within the meaning of the Act. Our 
holding was based, in part, upon the absence of certain 
significant indicia of employment, such as the right to choose 
alternative employment and, in part, upon our understanding that 
the Legislature did not intend to include the labor performed by 
prison inmates in the State correctional services system in the 
definition of employment covered by the Act. 
Unlike the Director, we hold that it is too narrow a reading 
of Correctional Services to conclude that it creates or endorses 
a balancing test for covered employment. The basis for our 
decision in that case was that "the employment relationship to 
the New York State Department of Correctional Services of the 
prisoners incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility is 
too peripheral to be covered by the Taylor Law."^-/ The absence 
of important employment indicia, a legislative intent to exclude 
inmate labor from the Act and public policy considerations 
disfavoring coverage determined the outcome in Correctional 
Services. We did not hold in Correctional Services that the 
inmates' relationship to the State as prisoner was primary to 
their employment relationship, but held instead that an 
employment relationship, as contemplated by the Act, simply did 
not exist. Thus, no balancing test was used to decide which of 
the two relationships was dominant. The standard which we have 
consistently used to decide coverage under the Act is whether an 
4/6 PERB J3033, at 3070. 
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employment relationship exists and, if so, whether it is regular 
and substantial. That we have never since Correctional Services 
even arguably used a balancing test to determine the coverage of 
employees who held regular and substantial employment further 
supports our position that coverage under the Act is not 
dependent upon any balancing test. 
The Director found and the State concedes that an employment 
relationship exists between the GAs and TAs and the State. 
Therefore, there are only two pertinent inquiries in this case: 
whether the GAs• and TAs' employment relationship with the State 
is regular and substantial and, if so, whether there is, 
nevertheless, a basis to conclude that the Legislature intended 
to exclude that employment relationship from coverage. 
With respect to the first inquiry, we reject the State's 
contention that the GAs' and TAs' employment relationship is 
casual and not covered because they allegedly do not satisfy the 
rate of return to work which we have required of seasonal 
employees.-^/ Our seasonal tests, however, are not appropriately 
applied to the GAs and TAs who regularly work fifteen to twenty 
hours per week throughout the University's academic or service 
^/see State of New York. 5 PERB 1M3022 and 3039 (1972). 
Seasonal employment is considered to be casual if the employees, 
as a class, fail to meet any of the following: 
1. the season is shorter than six weeks a year; 
2. the employees are required to work fewer than 20 hours 
per week; 
3. fewer than 60 percent of the employees in the title 
return for at least two successive seasons. 
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year. The GAs and TAs are regular, part-time employees and are 
covered as such.-6-/ 
As to the second inquiry, we are unable to discern the 
existence of any intent by the Legislature to preclude students 
of the University, who are part-time employees at the institution 
at which they are enrolled, from being afforded representation 
and bargaining rights. There is no explicit student exclusion 
contained in the broad definition of "public employee" set forth 
in the Act, which does exclude certain other employees.-^/ 
Although the list of employees who are excluded from coverage is 
not comprehensive, there is nothing else in the language of the 
Act which can be read to implicitly deny the GAs and TAs 
coverage. Similarly, we are unaware of any other statutory 
provisions which would indicate a general legislative intent to 
exclude the GAs and TAs from Taylor Law coverage, unlike the 
State's Labor Law which specifically excludes student employees 
from coverage.-8-^ Moreover, several other jurisdictions, 
including Ohio, Hawaii, Illinois and Minnesota, have specifically 
excluded graduate student employees from coverage. These 
^See Onondacra-Cortland-Madison BOCES, 23 PERB 53014 (1990) ; 
Weedsport Cent. School Dist., 12 PERB 53004 (1979). In these 
cases, we held that our seasonal tests are not properly applied 
to persons who are employed throughout a work year. 
2/Act §201.7(a); See State of New York - Unified Court 
System, 22 PERB 553023 and 3051 (1989) , conf'd sub nom. Crosson 
v. Newman, 24 PERB 57001 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1990) (appeal 
pending). 
^/N.Y. Labor Law §511.15 (McKinney 1988) as interpreted in 
Theurer v. Trustees of Columbia University, 59 A.D.2d 196 (3d 
Dep't 1977). 
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exclusions are further persuasive evidence that the Legislature 
would have excluded the GAs and TAs from Taylor Law coverage had 
that been its intent. 
We also believe that the policies of the Act, as presently 
structured,^/ are carried out by our finding that the GAs and 
TAs hold covered employment. As the Director observed, the GAs 
and TAs render services for the University which are the same or 
similar to those performed by the employees in UUP's unit. 
Employees in UUP's unit enjoy the benefits of the Act and are 
subject to all of its restrictions and prohibitions. The GAs and 
TAs, as employees, should be similarly benefitted and accountable 
in the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent to the 
contrary. 
Having concluded that the GAs and TAs are covered employees, 
we are left with the question of whether, as CWA/GSEU argues, the 
GAs and TAs are most appropriately given a separate unit or 
whether, as argued by the State and UUP, they are most 
appropriately added to the faculty and professional unit 
represented by UUP. The Director did not reach the unit issue. 
As the parties have fully litigated this issue, and given the 
time it has taken to process the case to this stage, we are 
persuaded that in the exercise of our discretion we should reach 
the unit question at this time so that the parties may be given a 
final order on all issues. 
^ W e express no opinion as to whether the GAs or TAs should 
be covered by the Act, only that they are covered currently. 
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Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties' 
arguments on the unit issue, we find that the GAs and TAs are 
most appropriately placed in a separate negotiating unit 
consisting of all graduate students of the University holding 
State-funded positions as either graduate assistants or teaching 
assistants, excluding all other employees. As the facts recited 
by the Director show, the GAs1 and TAs' dual status is 
unique, 3=^ / and they have little, if any, community of interest 
with the employees in UUP's existing unit; Moreover, we see a 
significant potential for a conflict of interest if the GAs and 
TAs were placed into UUP's faculty and professional unit growing 
out of, among other things, the supervisory role exercised by the 
faculty over the GAs1 and TAs* work,-^^/ the tremendous 
disparity in wages and benefits-l^/between the faculty and the 
GAs and TAs, and the faculty's control of the GAs' and TAs' 
student relationship, which could be used to affect the GAs' and 
TAs' employment relationship. Although mindful that the creation 
of an additional negotiating unit may be administratively 
inconvenient for the State,-i-3-/ we believe that only a separate 
^S/see County of Erie (E.J. Meyer Memorial Hospital), 9 PERB 
[^3029 (1976) (medical interns and residents fragmented from white 
collar unit; separate unit most appropriate). 
ii/see County of Ulster. 16 PERB J[3069 (1983) for a 
discussion of supervisory conflict of interest. 
i^See Brighton Cent. School Dist. . 13 PERB ^3088 (1980) . 
W w e give no weight to the State's administrative 
convenience argument to the extent it rests upon the identity of 
the bargaining agent and not the composition of the unit itself. 
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negotiating unit will afford the GAs and TAs a meaningful 
opportunity to exercise their statutory rights as public 
employees. 
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that such of 
CWA/GSEU's exceptions as are raised to the Director's finding 
that the GAs and TAs are not covered employees are granted. The 
Director's decision in that respect is reversed and the case is 
remanded to the Director for further proceedings consistent with 
this decision. 
DATED: October 8, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline Kinsella, Chairperson 
lu, A'Uc:^'-
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
Eric IK Schmertz, Member 
